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EIGHTH AMENDMENT-THE DEATH
PENALTY FOR JUVENILES: A
STATE'S RIGHT OR A CHILD'S
INJUSTICE?
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988).
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 29, 1988, the United States Supreme Court vacated
the death sentence of William Wayne Thompson, a fifteen year old
Oklahoman found guilty of first degree murder.' The case was de-
cided under the auspices of the eighth amendment's prohibition
against the infliction of "cruel and unusual punishment."' 2 By exam-
ining the treatment of chronological age in state and federal capital
punishment statutes, the behavior of juries, and the disproportion-
ality between the death penalty and ajuvenile's culpability, a plural-
ity of the Court determined that the execution of a person less than
sixteen years of age at the time of the commission of a capital of-
fense3 is unconstitutional. Justice O'Connor, in a concurring opin-
ion, rejected the plurality's bright line rule but nevertheless vacated
Thompson's death penalty due to the Oklahoma legislature's appar-
ent lack of careful deliberati6n in permitting a juvenile to be trans-
ferred from juvenile court to criminal court where he would thereby
be subjected to the state's capital punishment statute.
After challenging the import of the Court's survey of legislation
and jury behavior, this Note proposes that the great strength of the
Court's opinion lies in its affirmance of the fundamental precepts
and objects of the juvenile justice system, a system that has until
recently suffered the harsh criticism of a skeptical Court.
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In the early morning hours ofJanuary 23, 1983, fifteen year old
1 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988).
2 The eighth amendment provides that "excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII.
3 A capital offense is a crime for which one of the possible punishments is death.
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William Wayne Thompson along with three older persons mur-
dered Thompson's brother-in-law, Charles Keene.4 The victim's
body was discovered February 18, 1983, anchored to a concrete
block in the Washita River.5 Keene had received gunshot wounds in
both the head and chest, a broken leg, cuts on his throat, chest and
abdomen,6 and multiple bruises and abrasions about his head and
face. 7 The four defendants were each sentenced to death at sepa-
rate trials in Oklahoma courts.8
In light of William Wayne Thompson's status as a child under
Oklahoma law,9 the district attorney petitioned the court to certify
Thompson to stand trial as an adult.' 0 In the certification hearing,
the district court found probable cause to believe that Thompson
had committed first degree murder," supported in large part by
Thompson's frequent admissions of his role in the murder. 12 Fur-
4 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2690.
5 Id.
6 One of Thompson's codefendants ultimately testified that Thompson had cut
Keene before throwing him in the river " 'so the fish could eat his body.' " Id. at 2712
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
7 Id. at 2690.
8 Id.
9 The relevant Oklahoma statute provides in pertinent part:
When used in this title, unless the context otherwise requires: 1. "Child" means
any person under eighteen (18) years of age, except for any person sixteen (16) or
seventeen (17) years of age who is charged with murder, kidnapping for purposes of
extortion, robbery with a dangerous weapon, rape in the first degree, use of a fire-
arm or other offensive weapon while committing a felony, arson in the first degree,
burglary with explosives, shooting with intent to kill, manslaughter in the first de-
gree, or nonconsensual sodomy.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1101 (West 1987).
10 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2713 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The relevant Oklahoma stat-
ute provides in pertinent part:
(b) Except as otherwise provided by law, if a child is charged with delinquency as a
result of an offense which would be a felony if committed by an adult, the court on
its own motion or at the request of the district attorney shall conduct a preliminary
hearing to determine whether or not there is prosecutive merit to the complaint. If
the court finds that prosecutive merit exists, it shall continue the hearing for a suffi-
cient period of time to conduct an investigation and further hearing to determine
the prospects for reasonable rehabilitation of the child if he should be found to have
committed the alleged act or omission. ...
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1112 (West 1987).
11 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2713 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
12 Id. at 2712 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Although Thompson claimed that the murder
was justified due to Keene's abuse of Thompson's sister, Thompson expressed little
regret when admitting his participation in the murder on several occasions. First, on the
night of the murder, Thompson told his girlfriend, "'we're going to kill Charles.'" Sec-
ond, upon his return, he declared, "'we killed him. I shot him in the head and cut his
throat and threw him in the river.'" Third, another witness later heard Thompson tell
his mother that " 'he killed him. Charles was dead and Vicki [Thompson's sister] didn't
have to worry about him anymore.' " Fourth, yet another witness asked Thompson the
source of some hair adhering to Thompson's boots; he replied that he had kicked Keene
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thermore, the district court determined that "no reasonable prospects
for rehabilitation" existed for Thompson, and therefore ordered
that he stand trial as an adult.13 Thompson appealed to the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, which subsequently affirmed
certification. 14
A jury found Thompson guilty of first degree murder on De-
cember 9, 1983.15 The same jury determined at the penalty phase
of the trial that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, and
cruel, but could not conclude that the defendant was likely to com-
mit further criminal acts of violence constituting a continuing threat
to society. 16 The jury thereby fixed Thompson's punishment at
death. 17 The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Thompson's con-
viction and sentence on August 29, 1986,18 stating that "'once a
minor is certified to stand trial as an adult, he may also, without
in the head with the boots and, moreover, that he had cut Keene's throat and chest and
shot him in the head. Finally, after a witness claimed to have seen Keene dancing at a
local bar, Thompson remarked that that would be hard to do since Keene had a bullet in
his head. Id. at 2712 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
13 Id. at 2690 (emphasis in original). In determining whether prospects for reason-
able rehabilitation exist, the court must consider the following:
1. The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community, and whether the al-
leged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or willful
manner;
2. Whether the offense was against persons or property, greater weight being
given to offenses against persons especially if personal injury resulted;
3. The sophistication and maturity of thejuvenile and his capability of distinguish-
ing right from wrong as determined by consideration of his psychological evalua-
tion, home, environmental situation, emotional attitude and pattern of living;
4. The record and previous history of the juvenile, including previous contacts
with community agencies, law enforcement agencies, schools, juvenile courts and
other jurisdictions, prior periods of probation or prior commitments to juvenile
institutions;
5. The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of rea-
sonable rehabilitation of the juvenile if he is found to have committed the alleged
offense, by the use of procedures and facilities currently available to the juvenile
court; and
6. Whether the offense occurred while the juvenile was escaping or in an escape
status from an institution for delinquent children.
OKLA. STAT ANN. tit. 10, § 1112 (West 1987).
14 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2713 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
15 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). The relevant Oklahoma statute provides in pertinent
part: "A. A person commits murder in the first degree when he unlawfully and with
malice aforethought causes the death of another human being. Malice is that deliberate
intention unlawfully to take away the life of a human being, which is manifested by exter-
nal circumstances capable of proof." OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.7 (West 1982).
16 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2690.
17 Id. The relevant Oklahoma statute provides in pertinent part: "A. A person who
is convicted of or pleads guilty or nolo contendere to murder in the first degree shall be
punished by death, by imprisonment for life without parole or by imprisonment for
life." OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.9 (West 1988)(amended in 1987 to include the
"imprisonment for life without parole" penalty option).
18 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2690.
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violating the Constitution, be punished as an adult.'"19
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 20 to con-
sider whether a death sentence constitutes cruel and unusual pun-
ishment in violation of the eighth and fourteenth amendments for a
crime committed by a fifteen year old child,2' as well as whether
certain photographic evidence, deemed erroneously admitted at the
guilt phase, violates a capital defendant's constitutional rights if
considered at the penalty phase. 22
III. THE PLURALITY-EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY
Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of a plurality of the
United States Supreme Court in Thompson v. Oklahoma.23 Justice Ste-
vens first noted that the Framers of the Constitution failed to clearly
define the contours of the eighth amendment's prohibition against
the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment, 24 and that as a result
judges must continually examine the "'evolving standards of de-
cency that mark the progress of a maturing society.' "25 The Court
has traditionally considered state legislation 26 and jury determina-
tions, in addition to its own judgment,27 as representative of soci-
ety's evolving standards of decency.28
A. STATE LEGISLATION
The plurality initially noted that state legislatures, including
Oklahoma's, recognize a basic distinction between children and
19 Id. at 2691 (quoting Thompson v. State, 724 P.2d 780, 784 (Okla. Crim. App.
1986)).
20 479 U.S. 1084 (1987).
21 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2691.
22 Id. Neither the plurality nor the concurrence attempted to resolve the second
question presented "given the Court's disposition of the principal issue." Id. at 2700
n.48. Moreover, the dissent stated, "we have never before held that the excessively in-
flammatory character of concededly relevant evidence can form the basis for a constitu-
tional attack, and I would decline to do so in this case." Id. at 2722 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
23 Id. at 2687. Justice Stevens was joined by Justices Blackmun, Brennan and
Marshall.
24 Id. at 2691.
25 Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)(plurality opinion)).
26 Id. (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 277-79 (1972)(Brennan, J., concur-
ring); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789-93 (1982)).
27 Id. at 2692 (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977)).
28 Id. at 2691 (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 293 (1976); Coker,
433 U.S. at 593-97; Enmund, 458 U.S. at 789-796).
The plurality explained that reliance upon evolving standards of decency is necessi-
tated by the eighth amendment's use of the term "unusual." The term means frequency
of occurrence or magnitude of acceptance. Thus, determining what constitutes "unu-
sual" entails reference to society's evolving standards. Id. at 2692 n.7.
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adults. 29 In searching for a bright line between childhood and
adulthood, the plurality noted that "the normal [fifteen year old] is
not prepared to assume the full responsibilities of an adult."30 To
substantiate its assertion, the Court observed that none of the state
jurisdictions 31 allows a fifteen year old to vote 32 or serve on ajury.33
Furthermore, all but one of the states prohibit a fifteen year old
from driving without parental consent,3 4 all but four prohibit a fif-
teen year old from marrying without parental consent,35 all but one
prohibit a fifteen year old from purchasing pornographic materi-
als,3 6 and most of those states permitting legalized gambling pro-
hibit minors from participating in this activity without parental
consent.37 Additionally, the Court placed great emphasis upon the
fact that the maximum age for juvenile court jurisdiction in each
state does not exceed sixteen.3 8
The plurality then focused on the status of the death penalty in
each state, particularly with regard to juvenile offenders.3 9 The
Court noted that most state legislatures have not deliberated over
the establishment of a minimum age for capital punishment. 40 The
reason behind this inactivity may be found in the fact that fourteen
states do not authorize the death penalty,4 1 and nineteen other
29 Id. at 2692 (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 590-91 (1975)(Powell,J., dissent-
ing)).
Minors in Oklahoma are persons under eighteen years of age. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 13 (West 1983). Oklahoma does not allow minors to vote, sit on a jury, marry
without parental consent, purchase alcohol or cigarettes, patronize bingo parlors unac-
companied by an adult, consent to health care services unless emancipated, or operate
or work at a shooting gallery. Additionally, minors are generally not held criminally
responsible (except when certified to stand trial as an adult as Thompson was), and
minors may disaffirm contracts except for "necessaries" (such as indispensible transpor-
tation to and from work). Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2692, 2692 n.14.
30 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2693. Furthermore, the plurality stated:
The very assumptions we make about our children when we legislate on their behalf
tells us that it is likely cruel, and certainly unusual, to impose on a child a punish-
ment that takes as its predicate the existence of a fully rational, choosing agent, who
may be deterred by the harshest of sanctions and toward whom society may legiti-
mately take a retributive stance.
Id. at 2693 n.23.
31 This encompasses all 50 States as well as the District of Columbia.
32 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2701 app. A.
33 Id. at 2701-02 app. B.
34 Id. at 2702-03 app. C.
35 Id. at 2703-04 app. D.
36 Id. at 2704-05 app. E (Arkansas is the only state that has no legislation pertaining
to the purchase of pornographic materials by minors).
37 Id. at 2705-06 app. F.
38 Id. at 2693.
39 Id. at 2693-96.
40 Id. at 2693-94.
41 Id. at 2695. The states in this group are: Alaska, the District of Columbia, Hawaii,
1988] 925
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
states do not specify a minimum age for the operation of their death
penalty statutes.42 As a result, the Court decided to put these thirty-
three statutes to one side "because they do not focus on the ques-
tion of where the chronological age line should be drawn."' 43 In-
stead, the plurality narrowed its focus to the eighteen states that
require a criminal defendant to have attained at least a minimum
age of sixteen years at the time of the commission of the crime
before the death penalty may be imposed. 44
Finally, the plurality cited as authority the views of certain pro-
fessional organizations and the international community.45 The
Court observed that the American Bar Association and the Ameri-
can Law Institute oppose the death penalty for any person under
Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, North Dakota,
Rhode Island, West Virginia and Wisconsin. Id. at 2694-95 n.25.
42 Id. at 2694-95. The states in this group are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Dela-
ware, Florida, Idaho, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Oklahoma, Penn-
sylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington and
Wyoming. Id. at 2695 n.26.
43 Id. at 2695. The plurality maintained, though, that a general comparison of the
states whose death penalty statutes would or would not permit the execution of a fifteen
year old would yield a two to one result in favor of disallowing capital punishment. To
arrive at this ratio, the Court added the fourteen states with no death penalty at all to the
eighteen states that have a minimum age of no less than sixteen years in their death
penalty statutes, along with South Dakota and Vermont, two states that have not im-
posed the death penalty since 1972. The total of thirty-four is twice the total number of
states that can theoretically impose the death penalty on a fifteen year old. Id. at 2695
n.29.
In 1972, a majority of the Court held in five separate concurring opinions that cer-
tain state death penalty provisions as written constituted cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the eighth amendment because the provisions often led to the imposition
of infrequent and haphazard death sentences. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
44 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2695-96. The eighteen states, with the minimum age for
the imposition of the death penalty in parentheses, are: California (18), Colorado (18),
Connecticut (18), Georgia (17), Illinois (18), Indiana (16), Kentucky (16), Maryland (18),
Nebraska (18), Nevada (16), New Hampshire (17), New Jersey (18), New Mexico (18),
North Carolina (17, except for an individual committing first-degree murder while serv-
ing a prison sentence for prior murder or while on escape from such sentence, in which
case the death penalty may be imposed), Ohio (18), Oregon (18), Tennessee (18) and
Texas (17). Id. at 2696 n.30.
45 Id. at 2696. The Court stated, "we have previously recognized the relevance of the
views of the international community in determining whether a punishment is cruel and
unusual." Id. at 2696 n.31 (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796-97 n.22 (1982);
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 n.35
(1958)).
A complete discussion of the relevance of the international community's standards
as applied to the execution of juvenile offenders is provided by several amici curiae
briefs submitted to the Court. Brief for Amicus Curiae International Human Rights Law
Group, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988)(No. 86-6169); Brief for Amicus
Curiae Defense for Children International-USA, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct.
2687 (1988) (No. 86-6169); Brief for Amicus Curiae Amnesty International in Support of
Petitioner, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988)(No. 86-6169).
926 [Vol. 79
THE DEATH PENALTY FOR JUVENILES
age eighteen at the time of the offense.46 In addition, the United
Kingdom, New Zealand, West Germany, France, Portugal, the
Netherlands, the Scandanavian countries, Canada, Italy, Spain, Swit-
zerland and the Soviet Union all prohibit the death penalty for
juveniles. 47 The Court also noted that three human rights treaties,
two signed but not ratified by the United States and one ratified by
the United States, explicitly prohibit the death penalty for juveniles
under certain circumstances.48 To complement its survey of legisla-
tion and professional and international opinion, the Court next ex-
amined the behavior of juries.
B. JURY DETERMINATIONS
To determine the public's acceptance of the death penalty for
juveniles, the plurality reviewed the frequency with which American
juries have imposed the death penalty on a criminal defendant
under sixteen years of age at the time of the commission of the
crime.4 9 The Court cited its earlier decision in Furman v. Georgia for
the proposition that infrequent and haphazard death penalty
sentences are unconstitutional. 50 The data, the Court maintained,
supported such a conclusion in Thompson in that only between eight-
een and twenty persons have been executed in the twentieth century
for crimes committed while under age sixteen, 51 with Louisiana exe-
cuting the last in 1948.52 From this data, the Court concluded that
"[t]he road we have traveled during the past four decades-in which
thousands ofjuries have tried murder cases-leads to the unambig-
uous conclusion that the imposition of the death penalty on a [fif-
teen year old] offender is now generally abhorrent to the conscience
of the community." 53
To further support its conclusion, the plurality reviewed United
46 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2696 n.32-33 (citing AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, SUMMARY
OF ACTION OF THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 17 (1983 Annual Meeting); MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 210.6 commentary at 133 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1980)).
47 Id. at 2696, 2696 n.34. A sentence of death is a potential penalty for exceptional
crimes such as treason in Canada, Italy, Spain and Switzerland. Id.
48 Id. at 2696 n.34 (citing International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec.
19, 1966, art. 6(5), 6 I.L.M. 368, 370; American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22,
1969, art. 4(5), 9 I.L.M. 673, 676; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Ci-
vilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 68, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3560, T.I.A.S. No.
3365).
49 Id. at 2697.
50 Id. (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 249, 274-77, 299-300, 312, 314
(1972)(Douglas, Brennan, White, JJ., concurring separately); Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 584, 794-96 (1982)).
51 Id. at 2697 (citing V. STREIB, DEATH PENALTY FOR JUVENILES 190-208 (1987)).
52 Id. at 2697 n.37.
53 Id. at 2697.
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States Justice Department statistics.54 Of the 82,094 persons ar-
rested for willful criminal homicide between 1982 and 1986, juries
sentenced 1,393 of these individuals to death, five of whom were
less than sixteen years of age at the time of their offense. 55 The
Court admitted that such statistics are subject to different interpre-
tations, but it suggested nevertheless that the death sentences im-
posed on the five juveniles between 1982 and 1986 were "'cruel
and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel
and unusual.' -56
C. DISPROPORTIONALITY BETWEEN ADULT STANDARDS
AND JUVENILE CULPABILITY
In the last phase of its analysis, the plurality questioned whether
it is appropriate to measure a juvenile's culpability by adult stan-
dards.57 The Court stated that " 'punishment should be directly re-
lated to the personal culpability of the criminal defendant.' "58
Furthermore, Justice Stevens maintained that ultimately the
Supreme Court should determine the proper interpretation of the
"sweeping clauses" of the Constitution, 59 including the "cruel and
unusual" clause of the eighth amendment.6 0
To underscore the mitigating force a young capital defendant's
age should wield,61 the Court noted that "adolescents as a class are
less mature and responsible than adults." 62 Consequently, less cul-
pability should attach to a juvenile offender than to an adult of-
fender even when both are guilty of comparable crimes. 63 Indeed,
54 Id. (citing UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS:
CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 174 (1986); id. at 174 (1985); id. at 172 (1984); id. at 179
(1983); id. at 176 (1982); UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS BULLETIN: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 4 (1986); id. at 5 (1985); id. at 6 (1984); V.
STREIB, supra note 51, at 168-69).
55 Id. The Court observed that 1.7% of those over sixteen years of age arrested for
willful criminal homicide received the death penalty while 0.3% of those under sixteen
years of age arrested for willful criminal homicide received the death penalty. Id. at
2697 n.39.
56 Id. at 2697-98 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972)(Stewart, J.,
concurring)).
57 Id. at 2698.
58 Id. (citations omitted).
59 Id. at 2698 n.40 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
60 Id. at 2698 (citing Furman, 408 U.S. at 598 (Brennan, J., concurring); Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 598 (1977)).
61 See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978)(uries in capital cases must consider the
youth of a juvenile defendant as a mitigating circumstance for sentencing purposes).
62 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2698 (citing Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 635 (1979);
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1982)).
63 Id. The Court relied extensively on the following passage from Eddings:
"Adolescents, particularly in the early and middle teen years, are more vulnerable,
928 [Vol. 79
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the Court argued that the juvenile justice system embodies the prin-
ciple that a child " 'has no criminal responsibility.' "64 Citing exten-
sive scholarship on the subject, the plurality concluded that special
considerations, such as ajuvenile's intelligence, background, educa-
tion and experience, should result in less severe penalties for juve-
nile offenders than those imposed upon adults. 65
The plurality reviewed, as applied to juveniles convicted of a
capital crime, the dual purpose of capital punishment: retribution
and deterrence. 66 With regard to retribution, 67 the Court held that
its premise is inapplicable to the execution of a juvenile offender
"[g]iven the lesser culpability of the juvenile offender, the teen-
ager's capacity for growth, and society's fiduciary obligations to its
children." 68 As for deterrence, the Court first noted that it is ques-
tionable whether capital punishment actually deters criminals of any
age. 69 Furthermore, before committing a capital crime a juvenile
will unlikely make a cost-benefit analysis that might attach weight to
more impulsive, and less self-disciplined than adults. Crimes committed by youths
may be just as harmful to victims as those committed by older persons, but they
deserve less punishment because adolescents may have less capacity to control their
conduct and to think in long-range terms than adults. Moreover, youth crime as
such is not exclusively the offender's fault; offenses by the young also represent a
failure of family, school, and the social system, which share responsibility for the
development of America's youth."
Eddings, 455 U.S. at 115 n.1 1 (quoting TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON SEN-
TENCING POLICY TOWARD YOUNG OFFENDERS, CONFRONTING YOUTH CRIME 7 (1978)).
64 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2698-99 (quoting S. Fox., THEJUVENILE COURT: ITS CON-
TEXT, PROBLEMS AND OPPORTUNITIES 11-12 (1967)).
65 Id. at 2699 (citations omitted).
Several amici curiae briefs were submitted to the Court concerning juvenile charac-
teristics and behavior. The briefs strenuously argued that juvenile offenders do indeed
deserve special treatment and consideration. Brief of the Office of the State App. De-
fender of Ill. as Amicus Curiae, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct'. 2687 (1988)(No. 86-
6169); Brief of Amicus Curiae the Am. Bar Ass'n, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct.
2687 (1988)(No. 86-6169); Brief of the Am. Soc'y for Adolescent Psychiatry & the Am.
Orthopsychiatric Ass'n as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988)(No. 86-6169); Brief of the Child Welfare League of
America et at as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S.
Ct. 2687 (1988)(No. 86-6169).
66 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2699.
67 Retribution, according to the Court, denotes "'an expression of society's moral
outrage at particularly offensive conduct.'" Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S.
153, 183 (1976)(Stewart, J., plurality opinion)).
68 Id. The Court emphasized that it has in the past invalidated death sentences which
lack the retributive effect. Id. at 2699 n.44 (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801
(1982); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986)).
69 Id. at 2700 n.45 (citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 624-28 (1978)(White, J.,
concurring); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 480 (1984)(Stevens, J., dissenting); En-
mund, 458 U.S. at 798-800 (plurality opinion); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 301-02
(1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 345-54 (Marshall, J., concurring)).
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the possibility of execution. 70 Nor will a juvenile likely be deterred
by the knowledge that only a handful of juvenile offenders have
been executed in this century. 7 1 Absent retribution and deterrence,
capital punishment for juvenile offenders is "'nothing more than
the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering.'- 72
Thus, the Court determined that the existence of a national
consensus, as evidenced by legislation, jury determinations, and
other factors, as well as the disproportionality of the death penalty
as a reaction to a juvenile offender's culpability, result in a constitu-
tional prohibition against the execution of persons less than sixteen
years of age at the time of the commission of a capital offense. 73
IV. THE CONCURRENCE
A. EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY-NO NATIONAL
CONSENSUS, YET
Justice O'Connor agreed with the plurality's contention that a
certain age exists below which a child should not receive the death
penalty, and that the Court must determine this age "in light of the
'evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.' 74 However, Justice O'Connor would require more evi-
dence before adopting the plurality's demarcation of this age at
sixteen. 75
Justice O'Connor first reviewed the relevant state legislation
concerning capital punishment. 76 She maintained that the evidence
weighs heavily against the death penalty for juveniles because "no
legislature in this country has affirmatively and unequivocally en-
dorsed" capital punishment for fifteen year olds,77 and because
those states that have banned capital punishment for juveniles have
done so "unambiguously. '7 8 Nevertheless, Justice O'Connor con-
ceded that nineteen states, as well as the federal government, theo-
retically permit juvenile executions as a result of the interaction
between adult certification procedures and capital punishment pro-
70 Id. at 2700.
71 Id.
72 Id. (quoting Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977)).
73 Id. The Court briefly considered drawing the bright line rule at age eighteen. In-
stead, the plurality limited its holding to the question presented by the facts of Thompson.
Id.
74 Id. at 2706 (O'Connor, J., concurring)(quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1958)).
75 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
76 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
77 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
78 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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visions.7 9 As a result, Justice O'Connor concluded that more state
legislatures will have to specifically address the issue before a na-
tional consensus can be ascertained.80
Justice O'Connor explained that a state legislature might unwit-
tingly apply a capital punishment provision to juvenile offenders.8 1
For example, state legislatures might provide for adult certification
of juveniles for reasons other than the possibility of subjecting the
juvenile to capital punishment.8 2 In fact, Justice O'Connor specu-
lated that those states that have lowered their minimum adult certifi-
cation age in recent years have probably done so only to make
available long confinement or maximum security facilities for seri-
ous juvenile offenders, rather than to make available the death pen-
alty as a potential penalty for such offenders.83 More importantly,
Justice O'Connor noted that Congress, 4 as well as many state legis-
latures, probably failed to realize the possible interaction between
adult certification procedures and capital punishment statutes.8 5 To
support this proposition, Justice O'Connor pointed to the absence
of any legislative history that might suggest congressional delibera-
tion over the possibility of juvenile executions under federal law,8 6
the United States treaty agreement not to execute persons under
eighteen years of age in certain circumstances related to military oc-
cupation,8 7 and the recent Senate ratification of a bill authorizing
the death penalty for persons eighteen and older who commit cer-
tain drug offenses.88
Secondly, Justice O'Connor argued that jury determinations
and death penalty statistics "support the inference of a national con-
sensus opposing the death penalty for [fifteen year olds], but they
79 Id. at 2708 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
80 Id. at 2706 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
81 Id. at 2707 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
82 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
83 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). For example, New York permits thirteen year olds
to be tried as adults b5ut prohibits the death penalty as a punishment for persons of any
age. Similarly, New Jersey permits some fourteen year olds to be tried as adults, but
prohibits capital punishment for any individual under eighteen years of age at the time
of the commission of the offense. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
84 See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 2149
(1984)(permitting the prosecution ofjuvenile offenders as adults if offenders are fifteen
years or older at the time of the commission of certain offenses).
85 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2707 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
86 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
87 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Geneva Convention Relative to the Protec-
tion of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 68, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3560,
T.I.A.S. No. 3365).
88 Id. at 2708 (O'Connor, J., concurring)(citing S. 2455, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134
CONG. REC. 7579-80 (1988)).
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are not dispositive." 89 Finding fault with a blind application of raw
statistical data, Justice O'Connor postulated that such data do not
reveal, for example, how many juries considered the death penalty
for juvenile offenders or how many prosecutors refrained from seek-
ing the death penalty for juvenile offenders. 90
Finally, Justice O'Connor disagreed with the plurality's dispro-
portionality derivation. 9' Justice O'Connor argued that, though
greater culpability generally attaches to adults than to juveniles with
regard to similar crimes, "it does not necessarily follow that all [fif-
teen year olds] are incapable of the moral culpability that would jus-
tify the imposition of capital punishment." 92 Moreover, Justice
O'Connor claimed that, absent proof to the contrary, capital punish-
ment might deter juvenile offenders as a class. 93 After citing a
number of cases in which the Court permitted age-based treatment
in state legislation, Justice O'Connor reasoned that state legisla-
tures, rather than a "subjective" Court, can more appropriately
gauge a particular legislative provision's application to various age
groups and to the widely varying characteristics among persons of
the same chronological age.94
In concluding its criticism of the plurality's reasoning, the con-
currence warned of the danger of relying on rote statistics to ascer-
tain societal consensus. 95 To substantiate this claim, Justice
O'Connor observed that an apparent trend toward abolition of the
death penalty, which began in 1846 and continued through the
1960s, unexpectedly reversed following the Court's Furman96 deci-
sion in 1972. 9 7 As Justice O'Connor stated, "any inference of a so-
89 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor reiterated two of the plurality's
statistical arguments: 1) a juvenile offender under the age of sixteen at the time of the
commission of the offense has not been executed in four decades, and 2) only five of
1,393 death row inmates in a recent five year period were younger than sixteen at the
time each committed his offense. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
90 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
91 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
92 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
93 Id. at 2708-09 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
94 Id. at 2709 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Hazelwood School Dist. v.
Kuhlmeier, 108 S. Ct. 562 (1988); Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984); McKeiver v.
Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968)).
Justice O'Connor recognized the limitation to this argument by citing the Court's
decisions involving the unconstitutionality of legislation that restricts a minor from mak-
ing an informed consent to abortion. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979)(plurality opinion); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52 (1976)).
95 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
96 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See supra note 43 and accompanying
text for a brief discussion of the Furman holding.
97 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2709 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In 1846, Michigan abol-
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cietal consensus rejecting the death penalty would have been
mistaken [in Furman]."98 Furthermore, "the mistaken premise of
the decision would have been frozen into constitutional law, making
it difficult to refute and even more difficult to reject." 99
B. MINIMUM AGE REQUIREMENT IN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT STATUTES
In agreeing to vacate Thompson's death sentence despite the
plurality's reasoning, Justice O'Connor focused upon the Court's
traditional treatment of capital punishment. 100 Justice O'Connor
observed that the Court consistently requires "special care and de-
liberation" in proceedings that might lead to the imposition of capi-
tal punishment.10' Accordingly, Justice O'Connor continued,
substantive and procedural restrictions must attend each decision to
impose the death penalty, thereby insuring "the serious and calm
reflection that ought to precede any decision of such gravity and
finality." 0 2
Justice O'Connor determined that the State of Oklahoma failed
to meet the Court's standard of careful consideration and deliberate
review in sentencing Thompson to death for the murder of his
brother-in-law.' 0 3 The concurrence noted that the Oklahoma legis-
lature enacted both a death penalty statute and an adult certification
provision that together rendered fifteen year olds death eligible
"without the earmarks of careful consideration that [the Court has]
ished capital punishment for all crimes but treason, beginning a trend that would con-
tinue for over a century. By 1968, "executions ceased completely for several years." Id.
(O'Connor, J., concurring)(citing F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND
THE AMERICAN AGENDA 28-29 (1986); W. BOWERS, LEGAL HOMICIDE 26-28 (1984); H.
BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 23, 25 (3d ed. 1982)).
98 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
99 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
100 Id. at 2710 (O'Connor,J., concurring).
101 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
102 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). To support this point, Justice O'Connor reviewed
the Court's substantive and procedural restrictions to date regarding capital punish-
ment, including: 1) the unconstitutionality of automatic death sentences and of un-
guided judge and jury sentencing discretion; 2) the rejection of legislative restrictions
on mitigating circumstances and of imprecise legislative restrictions on aggravating cir-
cumstances; 3) the virtual requirement of separate trial-like sentencing proceedings,
and; 4) the unconstitutionality of death sentences for certain crimes. Id. (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)(citing Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); Enmund v. Florida, 458
U.S. 782 (1982); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S.
454 (1981); Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430 (1981); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S.
420 (1980); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349
(1977); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
188-89 (1976)(Stewart, J., plurality opinion)).
103 Id. at 2710-11 (O'Connor, J, concurring).
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required for other kinds of decisions leading to the death pen-
alty."' 0 4 Justice O'Connor concluded that persons under sixteen
years of age may not be executed "under the authority of a capital
punishment statute that specifies no minimum age at which the com-
mission of a capital crime can lead to the offender's execution."10 5
The Oklahoma state legislature and the eighteen state legislatures
with similar provisions 10 6 should therefore determine "the ultimate
moral issue at stake" in the first instance by specifying a minimum
age for capital punishment. 107
V. THE DISSENT
A. EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY-NO NATIONAL CONSENSUS
The issue in Thompson, as framed byJustice Scalia in his dissent-
ing opinion,10 8 was whether there existed a national consensus that
"no criminal so much as one day under [sixteen], after individuated
consideration of his circumstances, including the overcoming of a
presumption that he should not be tried as an adult, can possibly be
deemed mature and responsible enough to be punished with death
for any crime."' 10 9 The dissent could find "no plausible basis" for
answering the question in the affirmative. 1" 0
To underscore its message, the dissent detailed the facts and
procedural history that led to the imposition of the death sentence
for Thompson. "'1 The dissent hoped to show that Thompson was
not "a juvenile caught up in a legislative scheme that unthinkingly
lumped him together with adults." 112 Justice Scalia argued, to the
contrary, that Thompson qualified for both adult certification and
the death penalty as determined, respectively, by a court that con-
sidered whether he should be subjected to the criminal justice sys-
tem at all and a jury that considered whether, despite his age and
maturity, he should be subjected to the state's most severe punish-
104 Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
105 Id. at 2711 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor did not intend that this
result extend to every human characteristic, such as intelligence and old age, not receiv-
ing particularized attention in capital punishment statutes. Rather, it is limited to those
characteristics, like minimum age, about which a national consensus arguably exists. Id.
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
106 See supra note 42 for a list of those states that do not specify a minimum age in
their death penalty statutes.
107 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2711 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
108 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White joined in Justice Scalia's dissent.
109 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2712 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
110 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
111 Id. at 2712-14 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See supra notes 4-22 and accompanying text
for a complete discussion of the facts and procedural history of Thompson.
112 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2714 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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ment. t" 3 The dissent next questioned the plurality's failure to dis-
cuss the original meaning of the eighth amendment's "cruel and
unusual" clause.1 14 Justice Scalia attributed this omission to the
weight of evidence supporting the inference that the execution of
fifteen year olds, both theoretically and practically, is not violative of
the Constitution's original intent.1 15 After establishing the basis for
its opinion, the dissent attacked the plurality's determination of
"'the evolving standards of decency.' "116
First, Justice Scalia agreed with the plurality that legislatures
are the most objective and reliable indicators of societal views, but
the dissent's interpretation of contemporary legislation differed
markedly from that of the plurality. 1 7 For example, the dissent fo-
cused on the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, congres-
sional legislation that lowers the eligibility age from sixteen to
fifteen for trial and punishment as an adult in federal courts.' 1 8 Jus-
tice Scalia acknowledged that there was no indication that Congress
deliberated over the legislation's possible interaction with existing
federal death penalty statutes, but insisted that, "on its face," the
legislation renders a fifteen year old eligible for death in federal
courts. 119 Furthermore, the dissent maintained that the majority of
113 Id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
114 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
115 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia referred to Blackstone's Commentaries, a
reputed representation of common law in the eighteenth century, as well as other au-
thorities which provided that any person above fourteen years of age could legally re-
ceive the death penalty. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting)(citing 4 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 23-24 (1769); M. HALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 22 (1736); Kean, The His-
tory of the Criminal Liability of Children, 53 L.Q. REV. 364, 369-70 (1937)). Justice Scalia
also noted that twenty-two juveniles were executed between 1642 and 1899 for crimes
committed while under the age of sixteen. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Streib, Death
Penalty for Children: The American Experience with Capital Punishment for Crimes Committed While
under Age Eighteen, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 613, 614-15 (1983)).
116 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2714 (Scalia, J., dissenting)(quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
117 Id. at 2715 (ScaliaJ., dissenting).
118 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting)(citing Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 18
U.S.C. § 5032 (Supp. IV 1982)). Justice Scalia noted that this legislation was a reaction
to Justice Department testimony that many juvenile offenders are "'cynical, street-wise,
repeat offenders, indistinguishable, except for their age, from their adult criminal coun-
terparts.' " Id. (ScaliaJ., dissenting)(quoting Hearings on S. 829 Before the Subcomm. on the
Judiciary, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. 551 (1983)).
119 Id. (Scalia,J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor attempted to diminish the importance
of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act with a reference to the recently passed Senate
bill making certain drug-related offenses capital crimes for persons eighteen and older.
See supra note 88 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia dismissed this argument because
the bill has not yet become law; moreover, if it eventually does become law, "[iut would
simply reflect ajudgment by Congress that the death penalty is inappropriate for juve-
nile narcotics offenders." Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2715-16 n.2 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
The dissent responded in like manner to the United States' narrow treaty agreements.
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states with capital punishment provisions, including Oklahoma, pro-
vide that juvenile offenders can theoretically receive a death sen-
tence for certain crimes.' 20 With the federal government and nearly
forty percent of state governments supporting its position, the dis-
sent questioned the plurality's reliance on capital punishment legis-
lation as dispositive of the existence of a national consensus.' 21
Second, Justice Scalia found fault with the plurality's examina-
tion of jury behavior, an examination which the dissent claimed re-
sulted merely in an inexact statistical exercise.' 22 Responding to the
plurality's observations that no juvenile under sixteen years of age
has been executed for forty years and that juveniles have only rarely
received the death penalty in recent years,' 23 the dissent stated, "we
are not discussing whether the Constitution requires such proce-
dures as will continue to cause [the death penalty for juveniles] to be
rare, but whether the Constitution prohibits [the death penalty for
juveniles] entirely."' 124 Rather than attribute the rarity of juvenile
executions to a marked societal consensus, the dissent suggested
that several factors have combined to reduce the number of execu-
tions for persons of all ages. These factors include the exercise of
executive clemency, 125 a general reduction in public support for
capital punishment, 126 and a trend toward individualized sentencing
determinations. 27 "In sum, the statistics of executions demonstrate
nothing except the fact that our society has always agreed that ex-
ecutions of [fifteen year old] criminals should be rare, and in more
modern times has agreed that they (like all other executions) should
Supra note 48 and accompanying text. Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2715-16 n.2 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
120 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2716 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent has merely com-
pared the nineteen states that have no minimum age for capital punishment, see supra
note 42, to the eighteen states that have specified a minimum age, see supra note 44.
121 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2716 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The dissent also criticized the
plurality's reliance on the status of capital punishment in other nations, stating that
"where there is not first a settled consensus among our own people, the views of other
nations, however enlightened the Justices of this Court may think them to be, cannot be
imposed upon Americans through the Constitution." Id. at 2716-17 n.4 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
122 Id. at 2716-17 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
123 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
124 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2717 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
125 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Streib, supra note 115, at 619).
126 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting)(citing V. STREIB, supra note 51, at 42 Table 3-1).
127 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting)(citing Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978); V. S'raEI,
supra note 51, at 56 Table 4-1). To underscore the danger of overreliance upon statisti-
cal data, Justice Scalia noted that for approximately seventeen years ending in 1927
there were no executions of juvenile offenders under age fifteen; whereas, for approxi-
mately seventeen years beginning in 1927 there were ten such executions. Id. (ScaliaJ.,
dissenting)(citing V. STREIB, supra note 51, at 191-208).
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be even rarer still."128
Third, Justice Scalia disagreed with* the plurality's implicit as-
sertion that the individual members of the Court sit as the ultimate
arbiters of eighth amendment interpretation.1 29 The dissent main-
tained that the Court should examine the original understanding of
"cruel and unusual" as well as consider society's current under-
standing of "cruel and unusual," rather than focus on the Justices'
personal understandings of "cruel and unusual."' 30 Accordingly,
Justice Scalia reiterated the dissent's position that the original un-
derstanding of "cruel and unusual" did not include the imposition
of the death penalty on a juvenile offender, nor does society's cur-
rent understanding compel a contrary conclusion. 31
B. REACTION TO THE CONCURRENCE
Justice Scalia disputed Justice O'Connor's conclusion that the
Oklahoma legislature must explicitly determine whether a person
under sixteen years of age can receive the death penalty. 132 The
dissent stated that the concurrence failed to limit its decision to the
constitutional question presented after doubting the absence of a
national consensus.' 33 As stated by Justice Scalia, "I do not see how
... the problem of doubt about whether what the Oklahoma laws
permit is contrary to a firm national consensus and therefore uncon-
stitutional is solved by making absolutely sure that the citizens of
Oklahoma really want to take this unconstitutional action."' 3 4
Moreover, the dissent reiterated that Thompson's death sentence
128 Id. at 2718 (Scalia,J., dissenting). Justice Scalia warned that the plurality's individ-
ualized consideration might lead, for example, to an inference that the infrequent execu-
tion of women, seventeen year olds, and eighteen year olds in the past several decades
should warrant a similar constitutional ban against the imposition of the death penalty.
Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia further criticized the plurality's reliance on state and federal laws that
limit a juvenile's rights, such as, the right to vote. According to Justice Scalia, the
Court's cases "suggest that constitutional rules relating to the maturity of minors must
be drawn with an eye to the decision for which the maturity is relevant." Id. at 2718 n.5
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725-27 (1979)).
129 Id. at 2718-19 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130 Id. at 2719 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
131 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia relied on the following passage to illus-
trate the view opposite to that of the plurality: "'Minors who become embroiled with
the law range from the very young up to those on the brink of majority. Some of the
older minors become fully 'street-wise,' hardened criminals, deserving no greater con-
sideration than that properly accorded all persons suspected of crime.'" Id. (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Fare, 442 U.S. at 734 n.4 (Powell, J., dissenting)).
132 Id. at 2720 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
133 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
134 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting)(emphasis in original).
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was not "a fluke," and that even if it was, the Governor of Oklahoma
could use his pardon power to lift the sentence should Oklahoma
citizens so demand. 135 Finally, the dissent criticized both the con-
currence's usurpation of the legislature's right to specify the form
state legislation shall take,13 6 and the concurrence's subversion of
the principle that only a valid, rather than a hypothetical, existence
of a national consensus justifies judicially imposed constitutional re-
straints.t 37 "The concurrence's approach is a solomonic solution to
the problem of how to prevent execution in the present case while at
the same time not holding that the execution of those under
[sixteen] when they commit murder is categorically
unconstitutional." 138
VI. ANALYSIS
Thompson does not simply involve a plebeian capital punishment
issue that demands an examination of the nation's pulse. The case
also raises some questions about the juvenile justice system's inter-
action with the adult criminal justice system. The Court has spent
approximately the last twenty years granting juvenile offenders like
Thompson the due process rights and privileges that adult offenders
enjoy. During that same twenty year period of time, the Court has
refined and limited death penalty statutes to include the very class of
criminals to which Thompson belongs. As a result, the Court
pushed itself into a corner with regard to juvenile executions by
making it possible for a state like Oklahoma to constitutionally pro-
vide for the execution of convicted juvenile murderers who have
been certified to stand trial as adults. The Court's choice in Thomp-
135 Id. at 2720-21 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The relevant Oklahoma statute provides in
pertinent part that "no judge, court or officer, other than the Governor, can reprieve or
suspend the execution of the judgment of death .... OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1004
(West 1986). The warden of the state prison, as an exception to the Governor's power,
can suspend execution in the case of a prisoner who has gone insane or in the case of a
prisoner who has become pregnant. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1005-1013 (West
1986).
136 Thompson, 108 S. Ct. at 2721 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia claimed that the
concurrence's proposal will make it difficult to pass capital punishment legislation for
juveniles, just as it would be difficult to pass capital punishment legislation for "blind
people," "white-haired grandmothers," and "mothers of two-year-olds." Id. (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
137 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia argued that the concurrence "hoists on
the deck of our [e]ighth [a]mendment jurisprudence the loose cannon of a brand new
principle," which requires explicit mention of fifteen year olds in capital punishment
statutes. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia asked whether this means that any
appealing group deserves mention, such as "those of extremely low intelligence" or
"those over 75." Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
138 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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son was quite clear, either: 1) continue to equate the juvenile justice
system to the adult criminal justice system and thereby support the
death penalty for fifteen year old convicted murderers; or 2) recog-
nize that executions do not completely belong in the adult/juvenile
equation. Capital punishment and the juvenile justice system
clashed in Thompson, and youth emerged the victor.
To resolve the complex issues in Thompson, 'the Court deter-
mined that the eighth amendment question concerning cruel and
unusual punishment was the most compelling. Although the eighth
amendment issue is arguably the Court's most important concern,
the case unfortunately illustrates that the search for a national con-
sensus to determine "the evolving standards of decency" can delude
even the most objective querist. Notwithstanding the absence of a
clear national consensus, the Thompson plurality insisted that re-
course to a bright line rule satisfied the eighth amendment prohibi-
tion against cruel and unusual punishment. Considering the
alternative analyses the Court could have employed in reaching this
decision, its "Gallup poll" type survey of state law and jury statistics
seems especially dubious.
Upon discovering that no national consensus had clearly
evolved concerning the death penalty- for juveniles, the Court
should have examined whether Oklahoma's laws afforded Thomp-
son the constitutional protections, both in the adult certification
proceeding and in the sentencing proceeding, that the Court has
mandated during its past three decades of jurisprudence. If
Oklahoma's legal system failed to adequately protect Thompson's
rights, the Court could have reversed or vacated the lower court's
decision.139 Had the Court discovered that Oklahoma courts had
indeed instituted constitutionally sound proceedings which never-
theless resulted in the imposition of the death penalty, the Court
should have then examined in greater detail the extent to which ju-
venile executions deviate from traditional juvenile justice theory.
The plurality failed to recognize that the Supreme Court has
only rarely attempted to base so much of its decision upon a deter-
mination of the "evolving standards of decency." Justices Brennan
and Marshall accepted the petitioner's proposition in Furman that
society no longer tolerated capital punishment for just any crime,
but the Justices' separate analyses attached great weight to several
139 This was the type of analysis employed by the Court in Eddings v. Oklahoma, in
which the Court refused to consider the eighth amendment issue and focused instead on
the failure of the lower court to consider all mitigating circumstances in the sentencing
proceeding. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
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factors. 140 Justice Brennan considered that a severe punishment
must not be degrading to the dignity of human beings, arbitrarily
inflicted, excessive, or unacceptable to contemporary society.14 1
Similarly, Justice Marshall determined that a punishment must not
be intolerably painful and sufferable, unusual, excessive, or offensive
to society's contemporary values.142
The Court subsequently treated contemporary standards as but
one factor in determining the constitutionality of a particular pun-
ishment. In Gregg v. Georgia, Justice Stewart stated, "the [e]ighth
[a]mendment demands more than that a challenged punishment be
acceptable to contemporary society."1 43 In Woodson v. North Caro-
lina, Justice Stewart considered the contemporary standards, as
manifested by history and tradition, legislative enactments, and jury
determinations, in addition to jury discretion and individualized
consideration, to determine whether mandatory death sentence pro-
visions were unconstitutional. 144 In Coker v. Georgia, Justice White
observed that a national consensus against capital punishment for
rape very clearly existed because at that time only three states au-
thorized the death penalty for the crime of rape and juries only
140 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 257, 314 (1972)(Brennan, J., concurring and
Marshall, J., concurring).
141 Id. at 270-282 (Brennan, J., concurring). To support the principle that a severe
punishment must be acceptable to contemporary society, Justice Brennan stated that
"It]he progressive decline in, and the current rarity of, the infliction of death demon-
strate that our society seriously questions the appropriateness of this punishment to-
day." Id. at 299 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan, unlike the Thompson
plurality, did not infer that a national consensus thereby existed. Id. at 296-300 (Bren-
nan, J., concurring).
142 Id. at 329-333 (Marshall, J., concurring). After examining the historical applica-
tion of capital punishment, Justice Marshall concluded that "the death penalty is an ex-
cessive and unnecessary punishment that violates the [e]ighth [a]mendment." Id. at
358-59 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall further held that capital punishment
violates the eighth amendment "because it is morally unacceptable to the people of the
United States at this time in their history." Justice Marshall did not base this decision on
the existence of a national consensus, but on factors such as the superiority of life im-
prisonment to death as a form of punishment and the discriminatory nature of capital
punishment. Id. at 362-64 (Marshall, J., concurring). The Court's attempt in Thompson
to reduce its decision to a national consensus formula is certainly not supported by ear-
lier decisions regarding the death penalty, as Justice Marshall's Furman opinion
illustrates.
143 428 U.S. 153, 182 (1976)(Stewart, J., plurality opinion). Justice Stewart then ex-
amined the purposes of capital punishment, retribution and deterrence, as well as the
disproportionality of the punishment to the crime. Id. at 183-87 (Stewart, J., plurality
opinion).
144 428 U.S. 280, 288-305 (1976)(Stewart, J., plurality opinion). Justice Stewart did
not rest his entire opinion on the existence of a national consensus because, at that time,
ten states had enacted mandatory death penalty provisions. Id. at 313 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
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rarely.imposed the death sentence upon a convicted rapist.1 45 Even
given such clear societal evidence, Justice White further examined
the disproportionality of the death penalty as a response to the
crime of rape. 146
Only recently has the Court relied exclusively on the "evolving
standards of decency" test in deciding the constitutionality of a
death penalty provision absent a clear national consensus. In En-
mund v. Florida, Justice White held that imposition of the death pen-
alty where a defendant is involved in a robbery in the course of
which a murder is committed by a co-felon was barred by the con-
temporary standards of decency because only eight states author-
ized capital punishment in such circumstances and because juries
overwhelmingly and consistently rejected capital punishment in
such casesJ 47 According to the Enmund dissent, however, twenty-
three states at that time permitted the imposition of the death pen-
alty where the defendant neither intended to kill nor actually killed
the victims.148 Like the instant case, the decision in Enmund became
a battle of the interpretation of legislation and statistics, neither side
of which could easily claim victory.
In Thompson, the plurality and the dissent each distorted the rel-
evance of existing state and federal legislation. The Thompson plu-
rality argued that, practically speaking, the number of states that
prohibit the execution of a fifteen year old offender total thirty-four,
while only seventeen states theoretically allow such executions, thus
resulting in a 2:1 ratio.' 49 The Thompson dissent claimed that nearly
forty percent of the states as well as the federal government permit
juvenile executions.' 50 It is difficult to believe that both opinions
145 433 U.S. 584, 595-97 (1977)(White, J., plurality opinion).
146 Id. at 597-99 (White, J., plurality opinion).
147 458 U.S. 782, 789-96 (1982)(White, J., plurality opinion). According to the Court,
the death penalty could only be imposed on a participant in a felony murder if the de-
fendant killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill. Id. at 801. Since Enmund, the Court
has held that a showing of reckless indifference to human life is sufficient to satisfy the
culpability requirement for capital punishment as applied to a major participant in a
felony murder. Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987). Therefore, the Tison decision
somewhat redeems the Enmund Court's misplaced emphasis on a nonexistent national
consensus by recognizing that many states permit the execution of major participants in
felony murders even absent a showing of specific intent.
148 Enmund, 458 U.S. at 823 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Both the plurality and the
dissent agreed that the sentencing hearing failed to consider as a mitigating circum-
stance the defendant's minor role in the felony murders. Id. at 798-800 (White, J., plu-
rality opinion); id. at 830 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
149 See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text for the plurality's discussion of state
legislation.




were talking about the same legislation. Justice O'Connor, recog-
nizing the Court's impasse, acknowledged that the evidence weighs
heavily against juvenile executions, but concluded that this alone is
not indicative of a national consensus.15 1 As further evidence of the
distortions created by this national survey, not one Justice recog-
nized that the states that still permit juvenile executions are gener-
ally concentrated in two large regions of the country, the South and
the West. 152 The plurality's claim that a "national" consensus exists
is therefore untenable.
Furthermore, the plurality and the dissent contorted jury statis-
tics in Thompson as if magnifying a nearly horizontal curve such that
it appears to be vertical. The plurality cited the rare imposition of
the death penalty for persons under sixteen years of age at the time
of the crime. 153 The dissent rebuked this argument by stating that
juvenile executions should be rare; moreover, the dissent pointed to
the rare, yet constitutional, execution of women. 154  Justice
O'Connor again recognized the folly in trying to second guess jury
determinations through an examination of statistics, especially given
151 See supra notes 76-80 and accompanying text for the concurrence's discussion of
state legislation.
152 A regional examination of the country illustrates the absence of a national consen-
sus concerning the execution of fifteen year olds and of teenagers in general.
States in the South that permit juvenile executions are Alabama, Arkansas, Florida,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Virginia. In addition, North Car-
olina permits the execution of sixteen year old offenders under limited circumstances, as
well as the execution of seventeen and eighteen year old offenders. See supra note 44.
Kentucky permits the execution of persons sixteen years of age and older. Georgia and
Texas permit the execution of seventeen and eighteen year old offenders. Finally, Ten-
nessee permits the execution of eighteen year old offenders. In other words, every
Southern State permits the execution of teenagers.
States in the western half of the country that permit juvenile executions are Arizona,
Idaho, Montana, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. In addition, Nevada
permits the execution of persons sixteen years of age and older, and California, Colo-
rado, New Mexico, Nebraska, and Oregon permit the execution of eighteen year old
offenders. Only Alaska, Hawaii, Kansas, and North Dakota prohibit the execution of
teenagers in the western regions of the country.
Many Midwestern States permit the execution of teenagers, as well, including Illi-
nois (18), Indiana (16), Missouri (no minimum age), and Ohio (18). Eastern States that
permit the execution of teenagers include Connecticut (18), Delaware (no minimum
age), Maryland (18), New Hampshire (17), New Jersey (18), Pennsylvania (no minimum
age), and Vermont (no minimum age). Indeed, the only geographic region that prohib-
its the execution of juveniles is the North Central region, including Iowa, Michigan,
Minnesota, and Wisconsin.
See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text for the plurality's complete categori-
zation of state capital punishment statutes.
153 See supra notes 49-56 and accompanying text for the plurality's discussion of jury
determinations.
154 See supra notes 122-128 and accompanying text for the dissent's discussion ofjury
determinations.
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the cyclical and often unpredictable nature of society's position on
capital punishment.1 55 Had the Court considered its historical use
of contemporary standards as but one factor in determining the con-
stitutionality of a particular death penalty provision, it would have
recognized, as did Justice O'Connor, that legislation and jury deter-
minations merely lend support to the plurality's conclusion and are
not dispositive of the eighth amendment question confronting the
Court.
Given the divided Court and the nonparticipation of newly ap-
pointed Justice Kennedy, Justice O'Connor's concurrence might
provide the actual holding in Thompson. 56 The concurring opinion
does not escape criticism, however. A careful examination of the
proceedings that culminated in the imposition of the death penalty
as punishment for Thompson's crime disproves Justice O'Connor's
argument that Oklahoma's legislature and courts failed to meet the
Court's traditional standard of careful deliberation and review.15 7
Furthermore, Justice O'Connor's opinion legislates more than it ad-
judicates. Indeed, the concurring opinion serves as a case study of
the impropriety of such judicial activism.
The Court has continuously instituted procedural safeguards to
protect a criminal defendant from the imposition of an arbitrary, ex-
cessive, or disproportionate punishment. More specifically, the
Court has on occasion addressed the disposition ofjuvenile offend-
ers. In Kent v. United States, the Supreme Court recognized the juve-
nile court's right to certify a juvenile offender to stand trial as an
adult and thereby transfer the offender to criminal court jurisdic-
tion.158 To satisfy the constitutional requirements of due process
and fair treatment, the Court decreed that a juvenile facing adult
certification is entitled to a hearing, representation by counsel, ac-
cess to records and reports considered by the juvenile court, and a
statement of reasons for the juvenile court's ultimate decision. 159
The Court in Kent recognized that the decision to transfer a juvenile
to the jurisdiction of the adult criminal courts "was potentially as
155 See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text for the concurrence's discussion of
jury determinations.
156 The Thompson decision was certainly not a consensus. If more states such as
Oklahoma specify an age of sixteen years or older in their capital punishment statutes,
and ifJustice Kennedy adopts the dissent's position, the Court might affirm by a five to
four vote the next juvenile death sentence case it considers.
157 See supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text for a review of Justice O'Connor's
discussion of Oklahoma's failure to specify a minimum age in its capital punishment
statute.
158 383 U.S. 541 (1966). The sixteen year old defendant in Kent raped and robbed a
woman in the District of Columbia. Id. at 543.
159 Id. at 553, 557.
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important to petitioner as the difference between five years' confine-
ment and a death sentence."'160 The Court recommended a list of fac-
tors that ajuvenile court should consider before certifying ajuvenile
offender to stand trial as an adult, 61 factors which Oklahoma's stat-
ute largely incorporates.162
In compliance with Kent, the Oklahoma district court certified
Thompson to stand trial as an adult. 163 After two separate hearings
in which it received fourteen exhibits and the testimony of fourteen
witnesses into evidence, the district court considered whether the
prospect of reasonable rehabilitation existed for Thompson and ul-
timately answered the question in the negative.164 The court found
substantial evidence that: 1) the wounds and injuries to the body,
concealment of the victim's body, and instrumentalities used to ef-
fectuate death all demonstrated the serious, aggressive, violent, pre-
meditated and willful nature of the crime; 2) the offense was
intentionally committed against a person; 3) Thompson did not suf-
fer from any mental illness or immaturity, and understood the dif-
ference between right and wrong at the time of the crime's
commission; 4) Thompson had a long and very antisocial history of
previous contacts with law enforcement; 5) neither counseling nor
institutionalization had had positive effects on Thompson, and the
prospects for rehabilitation were low; and 6) Thompson was not at
the time of the crime's commission escaping from an institution for
delinquent children. 165 The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
subsequently affirmed Thompson's certification to stand trial as an
adult. 166
The Court has gone beyond adult certification proceedings to
protect juvenile offenders and others from the death penalty. The
Court in Gregg instituted a bifurcated proceeding 167 to ensure that
the sentencing authority receives adequate information and gui-
dance and thereby avoids the imposition of arbitrary and capricious
sentences. 168 Furthermore, the Court has on several occasions ad-
160 Id. at 557 (emphasis added).
161 Id. at 565-68.
162 See supra note 13 for a listing of the factors enumerated in Oklahoma's adult certi-
fication statute.
163 Certification Order, District Court of Grady County, State of Oklahoma, Oteka L.
Alford, Associate DistrictJudge (April 21, 1983).
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 In re W.W.T. v. Oklahoma, No. J-83-362 (Okla. Crim. App. 1984).
167 A bifurcated proceeding is one in which the guilt phase and the sentencing phase
of the trial are two separate proceedings which often involve the same judge and jury.
168 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976)(Stewart, J., plurality opinion). As Jus-
tice Stewart stated:
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dressed the issue of individualized consideration in the sentencing
procedure. In Woodson, the Court held that in order to "guide, regu-
larize, and make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a
sentence of death," the sentencing authority must consider objec-
tive standards as well as the character and record of the offender
and the circumstances of the offense before imposing its sen-
tence. 169 In Lockett v. Ohio, the Court stated that "[t]o meet constitu-
tional requirements, a death penalty statute must not preclude
consideration of relevant mitigating factors."' 70 Perhaps most im-
portantly in the context of Thompso'n, the Court in Eddings v.
Oklahoma held that no limitations should be placed on the mitigating
circumstances considered by the sentencing authority.' 7 1 More-
over, relevant mitigating circumstances often include the age as well
as the mental and emotional development of the offender.' 72
Thompson's sentencing procedures satisfied the Court's re-
quirements as outlined above. First, Thompson's trial involved a
bifurcated proceeding as mandated by Oklahoma law in which the
jury first considered the guilt of the defendant and then, in a sepa-
rate proceeding, considered the appropriate punishment. 173 Sec-
ond, Oklahoma law provided that the sentencing authority consider
several objective standards as possible aggravating circumstances
potentially leading to the imposition of a death sentence t74 Third,
Oklahoma law did not preclude the consideration of any mitigating
When a human life is at stake and when the jury must have information prejudicial
to the question of guilt but relevant to the question of penalty in order to impose a
rational sentence, a bifurcated system is more likely to ensure elimination of the
constitutional deficiencies identified in Furman.
Id. at 191-92 (Stewart, J., plurality opinion).
169 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303-04 (1976)(Stewart, J., plurality
opinion). Justice Rehnquist disagreed, stating that "for a court to attempt to catalogue
the appropriate factors in this elusive area could inhibit rather than expand the scope of
consideration, for no list of circumstances would ever be really complete." Id. at 320-21
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
170 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 608 (1978)(Stewart, J., plurality opinion).
171 Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114 (1982)(Powell, J., plurality opinion).
172 Id. at 116 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
173 The relevant Oklahoma statute provides in pertinent part:
Upon conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant of murder in the first de-
gree, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine
whether the defendant should be sentenced to death, life imprisonment without
parole or life imprisonment. The proceeding shall be conducted by the trial judge
before the trial jury as soon as practicable without presentence investigation. ...
The state and the defendant or his counsel shall be permitted to present argument
for or against sentence of death.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10 (West 1988)(amended in 1987 to include the "life
imprisonment without parole" penalty option).
174 The relevant Oklahoma statute provides in part that "[aiggravating circumstances
shall be: . . .4. The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel; . . .7. The
existence of a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
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circumstances.175 Indeed, the court's instructions to the jury in the
sentencing phase of Thompson's trial stated that "[m]itigating cir-
cumstances are those which, in fairness and mercy, may be consid-
ered as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability or
blame. The determination of what are mitigating circumstances is
for you as jurors to resolve under the facts and circumstances of this
case." 176 Although Oklahoma law did not require the jury to reduce
the mitigating circumstances found to writing, 177 it is highly prob-
able that the jury considered Thompson's youth given the circum-
stances of the case.' 78 Finally, the jury's decision was automatically
reviewed by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. 179
The relative frequency of the imposition of the death sentence
for juvenile offenders in Oklahoma is further evidence of the state
legislature's probable deliberation over the matter of juvenile ex-
ecutions. The defendant in Eddings was merely sixteen years old
when he shot and killed a law enforcement officer, and yet he re-
ceived the death penalty for this crime in 1978.180 The Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Eddings' sentence, stating, "the
Legislature must have anticipated that such a youth could be given
would constitute a continuing threat to society .. " OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.12
(West 1983).
175 The relevant Oklahoma statute provides in part that "[i]n the sentencing proceed-
ing, evidence may be presented as to any mitigating circumstances or as to any of the
aggravating circumstances enumerated in this act.... .OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 701.10 (West 1988).
176 Sentencing Proceeding: Jury Instructions, District Court of Grady County, State
of Oklahoma, James R. Winchester, Judge (December 9, 1983).
177 The relevant Oklahoma statute provides in part:
In the sentencing proceeding, the statutory instructions as determined by the trial
judge to be warranted by the evidence shall be given in the charge and in writing to
the jury for its deliberation. The jury, if its verdict be a unanimous recommenda-
tion of death, shall designate in writing ... the statutory aggravating circumstance
or circumstances which it unanimously found beyond a reasonable doubt.... Un-
less at least one of the statutory aggravating circumstances enumerated in this act is
so found or if it is found that any such aggravating circumstance is outweighed by
the finding of one or more mitigating circumstances, the death penalty shall not be
imposed....
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.11 (West 1988).
178 Indeed, the Court has previously stated, " 'jurors confronted with the truly awe-
some responsibility of decreeing death for a fellow human will act with due regard for
the consequences of their decision and will consider a variety of factors, many of which
will have been suggested by the evidence or by the arguments of defense counsel.'"
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 320 (1976)(Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing)(quoting McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 207-08 (1971)).
179 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.13 (West 1988)(providing for automatic review
of death sentences).
180 Eddings v. State, 616 P.2d 1159 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980), cert. granted, Eddings v.
Oklahoma, 450 U.S. 1040 (1981), rev'd in part, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
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the death penalty."' 81 If the Oklahoma legislature had not antici-
pated such a result, it would certainly have revised the capital pun-
ishment statute in the years between Eddings' death sentence and
Thompson's death sentence. As further proof of the Oklahoma leg-
islature's intention to resist any revision of its capital punishment
statute, another sixteen year old was sentenced to death in 1986,
two years after Thompson received his death sentence.18 2 Given the
widespread publicity of Thompson's trial and its broad public expo-
sure, 18 3 the legislature would have modified its capital punishment
statute had the citizens of Oklahoma so demanded. In short, the
Oklahoma legislature has been on notice for nearly ten years that its
capital punishment statute and adult certification procedures can
lead to the execution of a juvenile offender.
Thus, Justice O'Connor's assumption that Oklahoma failed to
deliberate is simply unfounded. By the time Thompson would have
received a lethal drug injection, the following Oklahoma entities
would have considered the judgment: legislators, the Governor,
prosecuting attorneys, the juvenile court, the district court, the ap-
pellate courts, the jury, and of course, the public. More impor-
tantly, Oklahoma followed the Supreme Court's own guidelines and
decisions in creating and defining both its death penalty statute and
its adult certification proceedings. As the dissent stated, Thomp-
son's death sentence was not "a fluke."' 1 4 Rather, one can argue
that the Court had, through its prior decisions, placed its stamp of
approval on the execution of William Wayne Thompson and others
like him.
Because the Court's analysis can be easily refuted, the Court
must have misplaced its emphasis. First, there is no clear national
consensus. Second, the laws and procedures in Oklahoma are con-
stitutionally sound. Yet, Thompson's death sentence was vacated.
The Court is clearly sending a jurisprudential message that pertains
to neither a popular opinion poll nor judicial activism. Rather, the
relevance of Thompson is buried in the plurality's analysis of the dis-
proportionality of the death sentence as a response to a juvenile of-
fender's culpability. 18 5 The dissent called this portion of the
181 Eddings, 616 P.2d at 1166.
182 See V. STREIB, supra note 51, at 233 n.36 (provides sources of information relating
to imposition of death sentence for crimes committed by sixteen year old Oklahoman
Sean Richard Sellers).
183 See V.STREiB, supra note 5 1, at 215 n. 118 (Thompson was interviewed in 1985 for a
television news special on a major network).
184 See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
185 See supra notes 57-73 and accompanying text for the plurality's discussion of the
disproportionality of the death penalty as a response to a juvenile's culpability..
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plurality's argument "irrelevant,"'' 8 6 while the concurrence main-
tained that some fifteen year olds harbor the kind of moral culpabil-
ity that justifies the imposition of a death sentence. 8 7
Unfortunately, the real issue at stake escaped extensive considera-
tion in all three opinions.
Thompson's death sentence challenged whether the juvenile
justice system or the adult criminal justice system serves as the most
appropriate forum for streetwise, hardened, repeat juvenile offend-
ers. Because adult certification proceedings are capable of making
that determination, the question confronting the Court was whether
the adult criminal justice system may sentence a child to die.
For a period in this country's history, a young offender was
treated no differently than an adult; a murderer was a murderer,
regardless of age. Then in 1899, the juvenile justice system was
born. 18 As the Supreme Court has recognized, the objectives of
the juvenile system "are to provide measures of guidance and reha-
bilitation for the child and protection for society, not to fix criminal
responsibility, guilt and punishment." 8 9 As a! result, "[t]he State is
parens patriae rather than prosecuting attorney and judge."' 90 For
the first half of the twentieth century, the juvenile justice system was
kept separate and distinct from the adult criminal justice system.' 9 '
However, the execution of certain juvenile offenders as well as some
incarceration ofjuveniles in adult penal facilities continued.192 Nev-
ertheless, a child convicted in criminal court generally received a
186 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 108 S. Ct. 2687, 2719 (1988)(Scalia, J., dissenting).
187 Id. at 2708 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
188 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1967). The juvenile court movement began in Illi-
nois and has since spread to every state and the District of Columbia. Id. This discus-
sion is not meant to be a complete historical survey of the juvenile justice system, but
rather an overview of its goals and objectives.
189 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 554 (1966). The Court in In re Gault stated:
The early reformers were appalled by adult procedures and penalties, and by the
fact that children could be given long prison sentences and mixed in jails with hard-
ened criminals. They were profoundly convinced that society's duty to the child
could not be confined by the concept ofjustice alone .... The idea of crime and
punishment was to be abandoned.
In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 15-16 (citing Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Con-
text ofJuvenile Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. REV. 167; Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV.
104 (1909)).
190 Kent, 383 U.S. at 554-55. The term parens patriae has come to mean that the state
assumes the role of the child's parent in providing guidance and rehabilitation for the
child. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 265-66 (1984).
191 The period between 1899 and 1967 is commonly known as "the era of the social-
ized juvenile justice system." V. STREIB, supra note 51, at 4.
192 V. STREIB, supra note 51, at 4. Justice Black stated that "state laws from the first
one on contained provisions.., for arresting and charging juveniles with violations of
state criminal laws . . ." In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 60 (Black, J., concurring).
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less severe punishment than an adult might have received for a simi-
lar crime.193
The juvenile justice system came under attack by the Court in
the mid-1960s. The Court stated that "serious questions" had been
raised about the juvenile courts which indicated that the juvenile of-
fender "gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the so-
licitous care and regenerative treatment postulated for children."' 94
The Court continued its assault by stating, "[t]he constitutional and
theoretical basis for this peculiar system is-to say the least-debat-
able."' 95 The Court was especially concerned with a child's right to
due process of law, but it did not intend to dismantle the entire ju-
venile justice system in pursuit of this right. 196 Rather, the Court
merely attempted to fill in the "gray area" shared by the juvenile
justice system and the adult criminal justice system. Accordingly,
the Court provided that certain, but not all, due process rights apply
equally to both children and adults. 197
It is important to realize that the juvenile justice system today is
neither wholly independent of nor wholly subsumed by the adult
criminal justice system, even as the Court attempts to define the
gray area.19 8 Even so, the Court's transformation of the juvenile
justice system into something different from its original 1899 form
has not gone unnoticed. Justice Stewart once commented that "to
193 V. STREIB, supra note 51, at 4.
194 Kent, 383 U.S. at 555-56.
195 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 17.
196 As the Court stated in In re Gault, "the observance of due process standards, intel-
ligently and not ruthlessly administered, will not compel the States to abandon or dis-
place any of the substantive benefits of the juvenile process." Id. at 21. See also In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 367 (1970)(observance of standard of proof beyond reasonable
doubt will not adversely affect administration of juvenile justice). In addition, Justice
Rehnquist has recognized the importance of preserving the fundamental aims of the
juvenile justice system. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 263-67 (1984). In upholding a
New York statute that provided for preventative pretrial detention ofjuvenile offenders,
Justice Rehnquist stated that "the Constitution does not mandate elimination of all dif-
ferences in the treatment of juveniles." Id. at 263. These cases illustrate the Court's
struggle in defining the gray area between the juvenile and adult justice systems.
197 Kent, In re Gault, and In re Winship form the basis of what is commonly known as
the constitutionalized era ofjuvenile justice. V. STREIB, supra note 51, at 5-6.
198 The present era ofjuvenile justice has been described as follows:
The juvenile justice system of the mid-1980s retains the essence of these philosoph-
ical roots, but in the context of a court of law. The system's procedures have been
brought into line with criminal court procedures, and the focus is somewhat more
on punishment and prevention than on the treatment of errant children. More seri-
ous juvenile offenders are being shunted from juvenile court to criminal court, and
very minor offenders are being handled informally outside juvenile court. Thejuve-
nile court continues, however, to process the broad midsection ofjuvenile offenders
and to view them in a parental or clinical manner.
V. STREIB, supra note 51, at 7.
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impose the Court's long catalog of requirements upon juvenile pro-
ceedings .. is to invite a long step backwards into the nineteenth
century." 199 Even though this warning has not come to pass, the
Court has grown more sensitive to the original objectives of the ju-
venilejustice system. In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, the Court held that
trial by jury is not required for juvenile proceedings and thereby
stated that "if the formalities of the criminal adjudicative process are
to be superimposed upon the juvenile court system, there is little
need for its separate existence." 200
The Thompson holding is consistent with the trend toward more
clearly defining the gray area between the juvenile justice system
and the adult criminal justice system. The Court's opinion of the
juvenile justice system, like the system itself, has matured over the
years. It has gone from recognizing the bright promise of a new
idea for juvenile justice to remedying the limitations of a system that
has not always achieved its laudable purpose. Most importantly,
though, the Court has not abandoned the principle that somehow
children are different from adults. Thompson is a recognition that the
juvenile justice system and the adult criminal justice system share
many common objectives and results, and that the death penalty is
not among these. There is no question that society should not ex-
cuse Thompson for his crime, but executing him eliminates all pros-
pects for rehabilitation and affords no more protection for society
than secured imprisonment. Moreover, juvenile executions speak
more eloquently of society's failures than of thejuvenile's crime. In
short, the Thompson holding is a positive development in juvenile
and adult criminal justice.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Thompson plurality reduced eighth amendment analysis to a
formula whose factors included state legislation and jury statistics in
order to ascertain whether a societal consensus exists regarding the
execution of juvenile offenders. In an effort to quantify its holding,
the plurality misplaced its emphasis. Justice O'Connor, on the other
hand, while recognizing that the numbers did not add up to a bright
199 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 79 (Stewart, J., dissenting); accord In re Winship, 397 U.S. at
376 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
200 403 U.S. 528, 551 (1971)(Blackmun, J., plurality opinion). Justice Brennan, in a
separate opinion, stated that "however much the juvenile system may have failed in
practice, its very existence as an ostensibly beneficent and noncriminal process for the
care and guidance of young persons demonstrates the existence of the community's
sympathy and concern for the young." Id. at 555 (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dis-
senting in part).
950 [Vol. 79
THE DEATH PENALTY FOR JUVENILES
line rule, nevertheless vacated Thompson's death sentence in her
new role as legislator. The dissent's "irrelevant" declaration con-
cerning the plurality's disproportionality discussion illuminated its
surrender to the plurality's recognition that youth deserve special
treatment in eighth amendment analysis.
The Court could not have anticipated the tremendous chal-
lenge imposed by Thompson's death sentence. The Court has long
maintained that the death penalty is a constitutional penalty under
certain circumstances, and further that the juvenile justice system is
itself worthy of merit. As the Court demonstrated, it is difficult even
for reasonable minds to draw an appropriate line that effectively
separates the child from the adult and the offender from the punish-
ment. However, since society can protect itself from violent juvenile
crime without resort to execution, the Court can safely guard the
principle that children, though deserving as citizens of certain fun-
damental due process rights afforded adults, must nevertheless re-
ceive the special consideration and treatment embodied by the
juvenile justice system.
The Court will soon consider the validity of capital punishment
statutes that permit the execution of sixteen year olds, 20 1 seventeen
year olds,20 2 and the mentally retarded.203 Hopefully the Court will
focus less on an examination of the nation's pulse and more on ca-
pacity, proportionality andjustice. The children of a decent society
deserve an enlightened Court that confronts the tough issues and
prominently addresses these issues in its opinions. As Thomas Jef-
ferson once said:
I am not an advocate for frequent changes in laws and constitutions,
but laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of
the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlight-
ened, as new discoveries are made, new truths discovered and man-
ners and opinions change, with the change of circumstances,
institutions must advance also to keep pace with the times. We might
as well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy
as civilized society to remain ever under the regimen of their barba-
rous ancestors.20
4
If this is the original and true expression of the "evolving standards
201 State v. Wilkins, 736 S.W.2d 409 (Mo. 1987), cert. granted, Wilkins v. Missouri, 108
S. Ct. 2896 (1988).
202 Stanford v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 781 (Ky. 1987), cert. granted, Stanford v.
Kentucky, 57 U.S.L.W. 3259 (1988).
203 Penry v. Lynaugh, 832 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2896
(1988).
204 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to a Friend (one of four inscriptions engraved on
the interior walls of the Jefferson Memorial, Washington, D.C.).
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of decency," the Thompson holding has certainly facilitated the ad-
vancement of an enlightened Court and an enlightened age.
DOMINIC J. RIcoTrA
